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A recent series of studies have been dealing with the dynamics behind the building of developmental states 
in Africa. This working paper is a contribution for that debate by looking at the experience of the Korean 
developmental state and the lessons that Africa can learn from this Asian country’s experience seen as an 
outstanding model of economic development. Despite poor resource endowment and a large population, a colonial 
legacy, the devastation following a civil war, persistent political instability, and the lingering military confrontation 
with her northern neighbour, Korea’s role in the international economic system has rapidly increased in importance 
since the 1960s. For nearly five decades, Korea has achieved a remarkable economic performance that transformed 
the country from a typical case of a developing nation trapped in a “vicious circle of underdevelopment”, into one of 
the largest economies in the late 1990s. Beneath the economic success lied a system of “socialisation of private risk”, 
a particular mode of organising the market, as the “visible hand” of a strong, bureaucratic and developmental state 
were able to accelerate the pace of economic growth by identifying strategic industrial sectors, making discretionary 
allocation of resources to those sectors, and minimising the collective action dilemmas pervasive in most developing 
countries. But the Korean state, as any other state, is a political realm that encompasses distinct, contending and at 
times colliding actors. In fact, the Korean developmental state provides us clues about the role that leadership play 
and what stands at the “heart of a politics of economic growth”. Policy choices and implementation rest on the 
strategies designed by the rulers to boost their political legitimacy, to strengthen their power, and to guarantee 
regime survival. Strategies are not only a product of institutional opportunities and constraints, but also of history, 
context, coalition politics and ideological templates involving the actors at the time of action. This paper will discuss 
the role played by President Park Chung-Hee (1961-1979) in building a bureaucratic-developmental state and what 
African countries can learn from these leadership experiences in terms of its own development path. 
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1. BEYOND THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE: THE KOREAN CASE REVISITED 
 
Studies of the Korean developmental state often reduce their analysis of the state to the examination of an 
autonomous and capable bureaucracy that selected and implemented policy goals that did not necessarily reflect 
the demands or interests of the society.1In this sense, autonomy was seen as holding the “ability to formulate 
interests of its own, independent of the will of divergent social interests”, while capacity brought “the ability to 
implement strategies to achieve its economic, political, or social goals in society.”2The literature on the Korean 
developmental state, however, by confining its research essentially to the study of the role played by the strong 
bureaucracy in fostering economic growth and development, fails to capture a complete portrait of the multiple, 
dynamic and interactive levels within the state strata. Additionally, such literature neglects also interactions 
between this complex state and society. Hence, there is a need to analyse the state with regard to its several layers: 
executive leadership, executive-bureaucratic ties, intra-bureaucratic dynamics, executive-society ties and 
bureaucratic-society relations.3Ultimately, the capacity of the state to pursue developmental-oriented public policies 
relies on ongoing political relationships between these strata, in particular of the executive with the other strata. 
The Korean state, as any other state, is a political realm that encompasses distinct, contending and at times 
colliding actors. Just as rulers´ strategies are subjected to the interference and possible neutralising power of the 
political society (whether political parties, unions, or interest groups, as well as to the needs of regime survival), the 
activities of the bureaucracy are bounded by political leaders, competing state ministries or agencies, and their own 
constituents. As Hagen Koo points out for Korea: 
“In efforts to highlight the significance of the state as an autonomous actor, analyses conducted in the statist 
perspective often ignore that the state is embedded in society and draws its essential characteristics from society 
itself. Both state autonomy and state strength are the products of interactions between the state and society, in 
which even a weak society finds diverse ways to influence state structure. State strength is neither absolute nor 
fixed, but rather varies according to social struggles and accommodation in multiple arenas.”4 
This scenario of the political fabric within the Korean state is one far from the portrait painted by the 
developmental state literature that underlines harmonious and stable features. In view of this dissonant and 
dynamic nature of the Korean state, political leadership cannot be assured, and like all other social actors, political 
leaders have also to protect their political interests. The developmental state literature, by equating state with 
bureaucracy, neglects the key role of those who control and direct the activities of the state.5In fact, the 
developmental state literature tells little about leadership, and about what stands at the “heart of a politics of 
                                                 
1
See Alice Amsden, Asia Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), Robert Wade, Governing 
the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), Ziya 
Önis, The Logic of the Developmentalist State, Comparative Politics 24:1 (October 1991) pp.109-126, and Jung-en Woo, Race to the Swift: State 
and Finance in Korean Industrialization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). 
2
See Karen Barkey and Sunita Parikh, Comparative Perspectives on the State, Annual Review of Sociology 17 (1991), pp. 525-526.  
3
See Chung-in Moon and Rashemi Prasadh, Beyond the Developmental State: Networks, Politics, and Institutions, Governance: An 
International Journal of Policy and Administration 7:4 (October 1994) p.364.  
4
See Hagen Koo, Introduction in Hagen Koo, Ed., State and Society in Contemporary Korea (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993) pp.5-6. 
5
See William Liddle, The Politics of Development Policy, World Development 20:6 (1992), pp.793-807. 
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economic growth”: “rulers’ and would be rulers calculations, that is, how they attempt to secure support, by what 
mix of policies, designed to appeal to which groups, with what political success, and at what economic cost.”6  
Policy choices and implementation rest on the strategies designed by the rulers to boost their political 
legitimacy, to strengthen their power, and to guarantee regime survival. Strategies are not only a product of 
institutional opportunities and constraints, but also of history, context, coalition politics and ideological templates 




2. “SOCIALISATION OF PRIVATE RISK”: STATE FINANCE, CHAEBOL7 AND INDUSTRIAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN KOREA  
 
Korea is usually portrayed by the developmental state school as an exemplary case of successful state-led 
economic and industrial development.8Specifically, this school posits that government control over banks in the 
Korean credit-based system was the critical tool to guide and discipline the business sector towards an effective 
industrial policy.9In accordance with this view, the Korean state, following the five-year economic development plans 
prepared by the Economic Planning Board (EPB), selected several export-oriented industrial sectors as “priority” 
sectors (such as automobiles, steel, shipbuilding, machinery and electronics) and provided them with massive aid, 
notably in terms of financial benefits.10The “chosen” ones would have preferential access to rationed and subsidised 
credit, foreign exchange, state investment funds, tax advantages, as well as other supportive mechanisms such as 
import protection and sectoral entry restrictions. But on the other side, through so-called “administrative guidance”, 
the government would steer these industries in terms of acquisition and deployment of technology, capacity 
expansion, and prices.  The ultimate consequence of this economic interchange between state and business was the 
institutionalisation of a system of “socialisation of private risk” in which the state sustains the potential risks 
associated with private investments.11This is regarded as the core of the Korean developmental state. This socialised 
risk can take such forms as deposit insurance, lender-of-last-resort, state guarantees, or subsidies to banks that 
become critically exposed to firms in financial difficulties. In the case of Korea, the state raised capital on the 
international markets and allocated the financial resources to private firms.12  
 
But what seems to have distinguished Korea from most other late industrialising countries was the discipline 
exerted by the state over private firms through its control of capital flows.13Thus, in the fast-growing economy of 
                                                 
6
See Robert Wade, East Asia’s Economic Success: Conflicting Perspectives, Partial Insights, Shaky Evidence, World Politics 44 (January 1992), 
p.309.  
7
Chaebol is the term commonly used to describe Korean large business conglomerates. 
8
See Alice Amsden (1989) Robert Wade (1990), and Ziya Önis (1991). 
9
See, in particular, Jung-en Woo (1991). 
10
See Ha-joon Chang, The Political Economy of Industrial Policy in Korea, Cambridge Journal of Economics 17:2 (1993), 131-157. 
11
See Robert Wade (1990), p.366.  
12
See Wonhyuk Lim, The Origin and Evolution of the Korean Economic System, KDI Policy Study 2000-03 (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 
2000), pp.25-26. 
13
See Alice Amsden (1989), p.14. See also Jung-en Woo (1991), p.2. 
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Korea, subsidies were provided under the principle of reciprocity, i.e., the recipient of subsidies had to obey certain 
performance standards in terms of output, product quality, investments in training, research development, and in 
particular, export targets. Export performance emerged as the state’s main benchmark to allocate credit to private 
firms.  While the system of “socialisation of private risk” encouraged private investment, the Korean state, through 
direct monitoring and a market test based on export performance, contained the potential costs of ‘moral hazard’ 
that could be created by state-guaranteed debt financing.14 Discipline in Korea took mainly two forms: (1) 
rationalisation of industries which succumbed to overexpansion; (2) and bankruptcy of badly managed firms in 
otherwise healthy industries.15  
 
The disciplinarian Korean state has been regarded as an “essentially” Weberian state, i.e, a state with the autonomy 
and capacity to formulate and implement economic choices free from the influence of private interests. Two crucial 
features are the basis of the East Asian developmental states: bureaucratic autonomy and public-private co-
operation. It is “the coexistence of these two conditions that allows the state and the bureaucratic elites to develop 
independent national goals and, in the subsequent state, to translate these broad national goals into effective policy 
action. The coexistence of these two conditions is critical.”16  
 
1.1 Bureaucratic Autonomy 
The state in Korea is usually equated with a strong and autonomous bureaucracy seen as a product of 
Confucian heritage and Japanese colonialism.17The recruitment of bureaucrats developed along a meritocratic line, 
and the highly competitive entrance examination tended to attract the best national students. Among bureaucrats 
there was a tendency to generate a sense of unity and common identity offering the image of a corporate actor that 
delivered coherent, consistent and rational policies aimed at achieving long-term national development goals. This, 
however, was only possible as long as the bureaucracy was insulated from pressures by any interest groups or 
distributional coalitions.18Consequently, the Korean developmental state has been described as a state where 
“bureaucrats rule while politicians reign”.19  
 
1.2 Public-Private Cooperation 
The other major feature of the Korean developmental state lies in the type of relationship built between the 
state and business sector. State and businesses have developed cooperative ties bounded by the system of 
“socialisation of private risk”. The strong state-centred literature further emphasise that in the Korean 
developmental state, the state and the private sector build cooperative ties, though the former is argued to set the 
                                                 
14
See Wonhyuk Lim (2000), p.26. The concept of moral hazard derives from the insurance literature and describes borrowing situations in 
which borrowers will have the propensity to be less cautious with borrowed money than if its was their own money 
15
See Alice Amsden (1989), pp.14-16. 
16
See Ziya Önis (1991), p.114. 
17
See Meredith Woo-Cumings, The Korean Bureaucratic State; Historical Legacies and Comparative Perspectives in James Cotton, Ed. Politics 
and Policy in the New Korean State: From Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam (Melbourne: Longman Australia Pty Ltd, 1995). See also Atul Kohli, 
Where Do High Growth Political Economies Come From? The Japanese Lineage of Korea’s Developmental State, World Development 22:9 
(1999), pp.1269-1293. 
18
See Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy. States & Industrial Transformation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p.30. 
19
See Ziya Onis (1991), p.115. 
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rules of the game through the system of “socialisation of private risk”.  Paradoxically, the only viable economic force 
at the time that could help the materialisation of the program was the country´s group of businessmen with “their 
singular advantage of organization, personnel, facilities, and capital resources.”20Though the government had seized 
the control of the country’s banks thus gaining the control of an important policy instrument, ultimately it had to 
find a compromise with the business sector. 
 
1.3 Challenging Bureaucratic Autonomy and Public-Private Cooperation 
The strong-state centred literature on the Korean development tends to reify the role of the bureaucracy as 
the main actor behind the country’s policymaking process. The bureaucracy is usually introduced as a meritocracy 
united and coherent in its selection and implementation of development policies. Yet, this interpretation fails to 
understand the political features shaping the organisation and the workings of the bureaucratic machine. The 
Korean bureaucracy is indeed selected according to a highly competitive entrance examination that has usually 
attracted the country’s best students. Despite the tendency to portray Korea as a homogenous country, the political 
considerations of Presidents have used regional affiliations as an important factor defining the organisation of the 
bureaucracy. In fact, regionalism in civil service continued to raise great debate in Korea.21Since the 1970s, and 
through the presidency of Cholla-native Kim Dae Jung (1998-2002), the home region, Kyongsang, of the previous 
four presidents (Park Chung Hee, Chun Doo Hwan, Roh Tae Woo and Kim Young Sam), Kyongsang, was over-
represented in the bureaucracy. Hwang Jong-Sung argues that, “because President Park Chung Hee’s legitimacy was 
weak due to his beginning in a military regime and his power was constantly challenged, he implemented the 
method of regional relationships to overcome potential uncertainty and danger.”22 In a country where the state 
granted businesses with a large number of financial benefits and tax incentives, geographical affiliation, school 
connections and kinship network seemed to have played an important role in the selection of those to be rewarded. 
The emergence of big business groups such as LG and Samsung from Kyongsang and the relative decline of the 
Cholla-based Samyangsa Group and Kyongsung Textile Company since the 1960s are an indication of how regional 
affiliations seemed to have been important for success in business.23 
 
The workings of the Korean bureaucracy have been far from following the patterns of a united body that 
applies efficient economic policies. Lawrence Westphal and Irma Adelman point out in their analysis of the Korean 
planning process that “the spirit of competition appears to dominate the inter-agency dealings to the detriment of 
cooperation in planning the achievement of common goals.”24The state-centric perspective is nonetheless right in 
emphasising the role played by the Economic Planning Board (EPB) as a central agency giving coherence to the 
                                                 
20
See Kyong-Dong Kim, Political Factors in the Formation of the Entrepreneurial Elite in South Korea, Asia Survey 26:5 (May 1976), p.470. 
21
See Heo Nam-chin, “What Happened to Promised Reforms?”, Joongang Ilbo (March 13, 2001) Cho Ki-suk, “Regionalism Trivializes Korean 
Politics”, Joongang Ilbo (March 21, 2001) Hwang Sung-dong, “Incomplete Study of Bias in Civil Service”, Joongang Ilbo, March 22, 2001, and 
Hong Soon-il, Cronyism, Korea Times (June 7, 2001). 
22
See Hwang Jong-Sung, Analysis of the Structure of the Korean Political Elite, Korea Journal vol.37, No.4 (Winter 1997), pp.113-114. 
23
See Soohyun Chon (1992), p.170. See also Young-Iob Chung, Chaebol Entrepreneurs In the Early Stage of Korean Economic Development, The 
Journal of Modern Korean Studies vol.2 (December 1985), pp.23-25. 
24
See Sung-Hwan Jo and Seong-Young Park, Basic Documents and Selected Areas of Korea’s Third Five-Year Development Plan (1972-1976) 
(Seoul: Sogang University Press, 1972) p.19. 
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government’s economic policies.25The achievement of this coherence involved the resolution of conflicts between 
different ministries through several EPB-led consultation forums such as the Economic Minister’s Consultation 
Meeting (EMCM) or the Industrial Policy Deliberation Council (IPDC). Yet, the technocratic bias of the statist 
perspective fails to acknowledge that the decisional power of the EPB ultimately rested on the political authority and 
support given by the President. Hence, during the 1970s, Park Chung Hee moved by economics, politics, national 
security and ideology decided fully to concentrate the country’s resources in the development of heavy and chemical 
industrialisation (HCI). In doing so, Park bypassed the advice of the EPB which proposed a gradual promotion of 
heavy and chemical industries.26During the 1970s the Planning Council, under the direct control of the President, 
emerged as the centre for economic decision-making for HCI.27 
 
Additionally, the private sector was far from being an obedient and passive actor.  As Chung-in Moon states: 
“Business might well choose a strategy of compliance and co-operation with the state if more benefits can be 
expected by doing it. It can also attempt to modify state behaviour through lobbying, protests, blackmail, and 
networking. In the worst case, business can pull itself out of (inter) dependence with the state and seek its own 
survival and expansion through such autonomous actions as diversifying political ties and even creating its own 
political shield (e.g., political parties).”28 
 
In sum, the activities of the Korean bureaucracy are subjected to the political interests of the country’s 
leaders. In this sense, Korean bureaucracy is far from being the main actor setting the configuration of the policy 
process. Additionally, the spirit within the administrative apparatus seems to be more one of competition rather 
than one of cooperation and unity in purpose. Finally, cooperative ties between the executive and the private sector 
should be seen as more complex than the usual dichotomy strong versus weak. There is space for variation and that 
depends on the capacity of negotiation of both sides over policy choices. 
 
 
3. AN ALTERNATIVE UNDERSTANDING OF THE KOREAN DEVELOPMENTAL CASE: POLITICAL 
LEADERS & THE BUILDING OF THE “SOCIALISATION OF PRIVATE RISK” SYSTEM (1961-1979) 
 
As in any other country, policy choices in the Korean state are forged by political leaders. In Korea, the President and 
his staff at the Blue House have reigned over the process of decision-making. Korean Presidents are de facto in 
control and command of the policy process. Chung Duck-Koo, who spend 20 years of his life as an official at the 
Minister of Finance and who would become Vice Minister of Finance during the presidency of Kim Dae-Jung (1998-
                                                 
25
For a study on the role of the EPB in Korea, see Byung-sun Choi, Institutionalizing A Liberal Economic Order in Korea: The Strategic 
Management of Economic Change, Unpublished PhD dissertation, Harvard University Press (1987). 
26
See Chung-yun Kim, Policymaking on the Front Lines: Memoirs of a Korean Practitioner, EDI Retrospectives in Policymaking (Washington: The 
World Bank, 1994), pp.83-85.  
27
See Byung-Sun Choi (1987), p.105. 
28
See Chung-In Moon (1994), p.145. See also Jae Jean Suh, The Social and Political Networks Of the Korean Capitalist Class, Asian Perspective 
13:2 (Fall-Winter 1989), pp.111-139. 
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2003) leaves no margin for doubts when he describes the Korean political system: “It is *a+ presidential system, not a 
cabinet system. The president has the last word *sic+.”29 Policy choices and implementation rest on strategies 
designed by Korean Presidents to boost their political legitimacy, to build up their power, and to secure regime 
survival. Their policy strategies, however, are far from being autonomously taken as they are filtered by the complex 
interaction of institutions, history, context, ideas, and coalition politics. An analysis of the origins of the system of 
“socialisation of private risk” is the first step to open the Korean developmental state “black box” and understand 
the state´s logic behind the decision-making process.   
 
The concentration of power in the executive, the re-organisation of the bureaucratic apparatus, and the 
introduction of policy changes, in particular in the financial system, may be regarded as the three major institutional 
and policy transformations during Park’s era that marked a turning point in the country’s economic development 
history.  
 
2.1 Strengthening the Executive Power 
In terms of the role of the executive in the policy process, President Park developed several executive 
mechanisms through which he commanded, coordinated and monitored the bureaucracy and its performance in 
implementing the country’s development strategy.30First, Park enlarged, empowered and extensively used the 
presidential secretariat made up of a chief secretary and six to seven other senior secretaries who were usually 
among the country’s best economic bureaucrats and assisted the President in the coordination and management of 
the bureaucracy. As the country launched its economic development plans, the staff was expected to counsel the 
President particularly on economic issues. From a total number of 15 in 1961, the presidential staff rapidly grew to 
over 100 in 1967 and above 200 in 1968.31Consequently, the President and his secretariat became the dominant 
centre of policymaking and policy implementation. At the same time, Park built a coercive and repressive apparatus 
through not only a series of legal mechanisms such as the National Security Law, the Anti-Communist Law and the 
Law concerning Collective Demonstrations, but also the creation of security and intelligence agencies such as the 
Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA).32Created in 1961 with an initial 3,000 employees, the KCIA would grow in 
the following three years to an estimated 370,000 employees (a notable figure for a country at the time with 20 
million people). But unlike its U.S. counterpart, the KCIA was explicitly framed to spy on its own citizens, to carry out 
both domestic and foreign operations.33Together with the National Defence Security Command and the police, the 
KCIA served well the regime interests to control and keep in check political opposition and the civil society.  
                                                 
29
Interview in Seoul, June 14, 2001. 
30
See Young-Whan Hahn, Administrative Capability for Economic Development: The Korean Experience, Korean Review of Public 
Administration 1:1 (1996), pp.186-190. See also Chung-Kil Chung, Presidential Decisionmaking and Bureaucratic Expertise in Korea, 
Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 2:3 (July 1989), pp.267-292. 
31
See Byung Sun Choi (1987), p.33. 
32
See Chung-in Moon and Yong-Cheol Kim, A Circle of Paradox: Development, Politics and Democracy in South Korea, in Adrian Leftwich, Ed. 
Democracy and Development: Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p.144.  
33
See Mark Clifford, Troubled Tiger: Businessmen, Bureaucrats, and Generals in South Korea (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.1994), p.80. 
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Second, Park relied on a group of so-called “bulldozer” type administrators that helped him achieved the 
expected economic outcomes in the early stages of the push for rapid economic growth.34Third, in his attempts to 
scrutinise bureaucratic performance, the President initiated what was known as the “New Year Briefing Sessions” or 
visits to the offices of each ministry during the months of January and February to obtain briefings on plans and 
strategies for the coming year and performance achieved during the previous year. The sessions were also attended 
by all the ministers, presidential secretaries, governors, leaders of the ruling party and National Assembly, as well as 
most of the bureau chiefs and section chiefs. This new presidential mode of operation was a clear demonstration 
that Park Chung Hee had a great concern for results, and only those who succeeded in fully achieving or even more 
of the planned targets could survive or be promoted, with those failing to comply with the goals over a certain 
number of evaluation periods facing possible sacking.  
Finally, the President himself personally became involved in the implementation of certain projects he 
deemed crucial for the country’s development. For examples, the cases of the Seoul-Pusan Highway, the Ulsan 
Industrial Complex, the Korean Institute of Science and Technology (KIST), or the POSCO steel mill. For Nam Duck 
Woo, one of the country’s top decision-makers during the 1960s and 1970s, the leadership of Park Chung Hee was 
crucial for the country’s economic development:  
“He (Park) always think about in his head and mind, all the time, all the economic pictures, what is going on, 
and so on. Once he knows the problem he tries to solve it, one way or another, right or wrong. He defines the 
program and tries to work out the system to solve the problem. And then tries to maximise the efficiency of the 
organisation, and the system. He constantly summons the ministers, the secretaries. Once in a month, he attends 
these briefings at the EPB about the economic situation. He also heads the Export Promotion Meetings. Also every 
quarter, attends a conference to evaluate the programs. He is really committed himself *sic+.”35 
With the executive showing a growing willingness to lead, manage and regulate economic policymaking to achieve 
growth and development, the transformation of the bureaucracy into a more effective apparatus was seen as 
necessary to carry out with the President’s economic goals.  
 
2.2. Reforming the Bureaucracy 
A series of reforms were introduced in the organisation of the Korean bureaucracy during the 1960s. These 
led to the creation of new agencies and, the redefinition of competencies and conventions in order to attain better 
performances in the country’s economic management.  Among the major bureaucratic reforms was the official 
establishment of the Economic Planning Board (EPB), and new procedures for recruitment, training and promotion 
within the bureaucracy to improve professional competence.36The EPB began its official activities in July 1961 and 
                                                 
34
See Young Whan Hahn, Administration Capability for Economic Development: The Korean Experience, Korean Review of Public 
Administration 1:1 (1996), pp.188-189. Hahn Young Whan describes them in this way: “they were Park’s ‘alter ego’, an incarnation of 
President’s other self, so deeply committed to the realization of rapid growth. These bulldozers worked extremely hard. Their nickname 
‘bulldozers’ came from their work style that did not pay much attention to difficulties or constraints of any nature. They just pushed the 
program through until the target could be realized. The President provided them with every possible means of support and defended them 
from all possible attacks. They reciprocated with achievements far better than the President had expected.” For the Park regime’s strong 
commitment to tax administration reform in Korea in the 1960s, see Chong Kee Park, The 1966 Tax Administration Reform, Tax Law Reforms, 
and Government Saving, in Lee-Jay Cho and Yoon Hyung Kim (1991).   
35
Interview in Seoul, May 30, 2001.  
36
See Young-Whan Hahn (1996), pp.191-193. 
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soon became the main economic governmental body in charge of comprehensive planning and effective execution 
of country’s Five-Year development plans, the first of these launched in 1962. Additionally, reaffirming the regime’s 
pledge to economic planning and development, the head of the EPB was simultaneously given the position of Deputy 
Prime Minister (DPM) from December 1963.37The importance assigned to economic ministries and technocracy by 
Park Chung Hee was evident as he actively sought to insulate the EPB from political pressures, and to appoint mainly 
economic experts to these ministries. Hence, from 1964 to 1979, only seven (14.7 percent) of 47 economic ministers 
were formerly military, in comparison with the 46 (38.3 percent) of the 120 non-economic ministries.38Although less 
mentioned, the creation of the Office for National Tax Administration (ONTA) in 1966 was probably as important as 
the EPB for the institutionalisation of the system of “socialisation of private risk”. Since its establishment, the ONTA 
has usually been regarded as the government’s most powerful coercive policy instrument to guarantee: (1) that 
capital allocated to the private sector would go into officially approved business areas and; (2) to punish the 
businessmen who had violated national economic guidelines. This would usually take the form of tax evasion 
investigations that subjected the firms judged guilty not only to the payment of additional taxes and penalties, but 
also to criminal prosecution. Furthermore, tax investigation could result in a decrease of indirect financing funds 
from financial institutions.39 
Another major reform during the 1960s, involved the consolidation of a meritocratic system in the process of 
recruitment, training and promotion of the administrative machine.40The government re-introduced a highly 
competitive and open exam system for the higher and lower echelons of the civil service in 1963 that attracted the 
best Korean students from the country’s top universities due to the social prestige usually associated with 
administrative positions.41 To secure the support and gain the loyalty of the growing number of mid-managers in the 
administration, Park Chung Hee pursued a strong policy of internal promotion, reducing the share of special 
appointees.42Furthermore, new training programmes for all the higher-ranking civil service were established in 1961 
in the Central Officials Training Institute and some ministries launched their own think tanks. Among the most 
important ones were the Korean Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) in 1967 supported by President Park, and 
the Korean Development Institute (KDI) under the auspices of the EPB.43 In sum, Park pursed a reform strategy for 
the bureaucracy that increased its size, improved professional competence and strengthened its capacity to deal 
with increasingly complex economic issues as the country focused on export-oriented industrialisation.  
                                                 
37
See Byung-Sun Choi (1987), p.5. 
38
See Young-Whan Hahn (1996), p.195. 
39
On the role of the ONTA, see Carter Eckert, The South Korean Bourgeoisie: A Class in Search of Hegemony, in Hagen Koo (1993), pp.102-103.  
40
For an overview of the Korean bureaucracy, see Meredith Woo-Cumings (1995). 
41
For a detailed study on the 1960s reforms on the Korean bureaucracy, see Byung-Kook Kim, State Capacity for Reform: The State in Korea 
and Mexico, The Korean Journal of Policy Studies Vol.3 (1988), pp. 69-91.  
42
See Byung-Kook Kim (1988), p.82. 
43
See Young-Whan Hahn (1996), pp.192-193. 
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2.3 Changing the Economic Architecture 
The reform of the political and bureaucratic institutions was accompanied by significant changes in the 
country’s economic architecture. The new government set two main goals: (1) mobilisation and allocation of 
financial resources to strategic sectors (exports) as defined by industrial policies set in the country’s development 
plans; and (2) the establishment of the foundations for full governmental control of the financial sector.44This 
involved: the implementation of a five-year development plan (FYDP) setting economic targets (namely in terms of 
gross domestic product, investment, domestic savings, foreign savings, exports and imports growth rates) under the 
supervision of the EPB, followed by; the allocation of resources to the industrial sectors considered a priority for 
national development.45    
Chang argues that the control played by the government aimed specifically at fighting “excessive 
competition” and “social waste”, with violators subjected to penalties such as revocation of licences, fines, and even, 
prison sentences.46Additionally, the government developed a strict system to monitor the performance of the 
private sector and guarantee the compliance with the targets. The most famous example being the Monthly Export 
Promotion Meetings chaired by the President and gathering selected ministers and top bureaucrats responsible for 
trade and the economy; the chief executives of export associations and; presidents of several business groups or 
chaebol.47Ultimately, the meeting “permitted the President to act directly on problems that individual industries 
were facing, often by simply issuing directives on the spot.”48  
In the early 1960s capital was scarce due to low domestic savings rate, underdeveloped financial and capital 
markets, as well as declining foreign aid. This led the government to initiate a series of financial reforms to provide it 
with the control of credit allocation in order to carry on with the industrial policies included in the development 
plans.49During this period, major changes included: the amendment of the Bank of Korea Act (making the central 
bank subordinate to the Ministry of Finance); the nationalisation of commercial banks and; the creation of new 
specialised and local banks. Foreign banks were also allowed to enter the Korean market, but not without 
restrictions in their activities.50 
At the core of the new financial institutional framework was the policy loan, i.e., the major financial tool 
linking the government, banks and business groups in Korea.51It was the policy loan that gave the government the 
capability to actively intervene in the country’s patterns of industrialisation. Under the regime of Park Chung Hee, 
there were four types of systems delivering policy loans designed to support export-led growth and the Five-Year 
Development Plans: (1) via specialised banks (in particular the Korea Development Bank); (2) via commercial banks; 
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(3) via National Investment Fund or NIF (created in 1973 to finance long-term investment in heavy and chemical 
industry plants and equipment); and (4) via rationing foreign credit.52  
Policy loans could be allocated in two ways: (1) Through designated credit programmes such as those for 
exports, agriculture, fisheries or small-and-medium-enterprises (SMEs). Loan eligibility was based on the specific 
program and borrowers received loans at preferential rates; (2) Through government directives, administrative 
guidance, and ad hoc interventions. Loans did not have preferential rates as the designated credit programmes 
above and fell into the same category as the general bank loans. These loans were usually made according to 
government assessment of the progress of specific key projects and the constraints facing specific firms or 
industries. Decisions were usually made in consultation between the government and business sectors, after close 
monitoring of the progress by the government. The government if necessary was known to resort to both formal and 
informal requests as ways to request the banks to support particular exporters.53 
 In sum, the new regime led by Park Chung Hee pursued a series of reforms forming the basis of the 
country’s system of “socialisation of private risk”.  The puzzle remains, however, on the motivations that led Park to 
favour and reinforce this system in pursuit of national growth and development. I argue that Park’s strategic actions 
to build the system of “socialisation of private risk” were mediated by a combination of historical, international and 
ideological factors. But, it was Park’s ability in assembling and mobilising a coalition during almost two decades of 
leadership that ultimately guaranteed the strength of the system, at the core of the Korean developmental state.  
 
2.4 Shaping the System of “Socialisation of Private Risk”: History, Institutional Legacies, Context and Ideas 
 
2.4.1 The Historical Legacies of Synghman Rhee, Chang Myon and U.S. Aid (1948-1961) 
The First Republic under President Synghman Rhee (1948-1960) and the Second Republic headed by Prime 
Minister Chang Myon (Aug.1960-May 1961) left important legacies that serve as crucial indicators for the 
institutional transformation Park engineered to sculpt the system of “socialisation of private risk”. During the 
leadership of both Rhee and Chang, party politics hijacked the decision-making process, turning the economic 
bureaucracy into a hostage of the interests of the executive, ruling party and private firms.54  
Furthermore, from 1957, Washington not only decided to change its aid policies from provision of grants to 
loans, but ultimately to cease aid altogether during the 1960s.55Since 1945, and in particular after the Korean War, 
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the U.S. played an important role in the country’s reconstruction through massive aid allocations.56With the end of 
the conflict in 1953, Korea became increasingly dependent on U.S. aid that financed nearly 70 percent of total 
imports between 1953 and 1961 and 75 percent of the total fixed capital formation.57In the late 1950s, U.S aid 
accounted for over 10 percent of Korea’s GDP.58In 1957, U.S. aid reached 382 million U.S. dollars, and from then it 
began to drop, to 321 million US dollars in 1958 and 222 million US dollars in 1959. Thus, the potential lessons 
offered by the First and Second Republics showed that party politics  undermined the decision-making process, 
weakened the economic bureaucracy, and politicised policy choices to ultimately jeopardise the country’s economic 
growth and development. Simultaneously, Washington’s decision to reduce aid only contributed to underline the 
need for the country to rapidly find solutions for its economic problems. 
 
2.4.2 Economic Context and U.S. Pressures 
After the military coup d´état in 1961, the new leadership launched a series of new economic 
programmes.59The new economic programmes were hoped to invigorate the economy. Instead, they not only led to 
a resurgence of high inflation rates, but also to substantial public deficits starting in 1961.60Simultaneously, foreign 
reserves began to rapidly dwindle following the implementation of the country’s first five-year development plan. 
With the new leadership engaged in building a self-sufficient economy, the plan led to a rapid increase in the import 
of raw materials and industrial machinery to stimulate industrial activities, in particular the construction of large-
scale projects such as an integrated iron and steel mill. Since the mobilisation of foreign exchange resources through 
exports, inter-governmental and private loans failed to reach the planned value, the government was compelled to 
use the country’s foreign reserves. By the end of 1963, Korea’s foreign reserves had decreased to no more than 90 
million US dollars.61To worsen the economic scenario serious crop failures in 1962 and 1963 not only demanded a 
temporary rise in U.S. grant aid levels during the period but also strongly contributed to push inflation upwards.62 
Inflation rates increased from around 10 percent in 1960 to almost 35 percent in 1964.63Faced with food shortages, 
rising inflation, decreasing foreign reserves, and under the threat of possible loss of much needed aid, the military 
government became politically vulnerable and seemed to have been left with no other choice but to comply with the 
U.S. pressure to pursue economic reforms.64The U.S. effect on Korean policies was made quite clear by Park Chung 
Hee in his writings: “As far as Korea is concerned, she must frankly admit that she is, realistically speaking, under the 
influence of the United States – whether she likes it or not!”.65Between 1964 and 1966, the military regime pursued 
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what was seen as U.S.-influenced economic reforms, namely currency devaluation, tax and interest rate reforms, 
foreign capital opening and export-promotion policies.66 
 
2.4.3 State-led Economic Nationalism and “Growth-First” Developmental Paradigm  
The country’s economic context, and dependence on US aid, imposed constraints on the behaviour of the 
new military regime, but it also opened opportunities in terms of policy choices that were embraced by the new 
leadership. As Wonhyuk Lim points out, “Park would go far beyond the orthodox economic policies prescribed by the 
Americans, and adopt drastic measures to promote exports and increase economic independence.”67Economic 
nationalism was particularly sought after by the new leadership, and this was visible in the Korean government 
preference for foreign loans vis-à-vis foreign direct investment.68Since the domestic firms at the time, lacked the 
financial credibility to raise capital in international markets, the government allowed state-owned banks to 
guarantee foreign borrowing. The population was asked to contribute to the country’s rapid economic development 
through such slogans as “Let´s try to live well” and “We too can do it”.69The actions, speeches and policy choices of 
Park Chung Hee revealed a leader who was interested in strengthening the nation through economic development.70 
In his nationalist stance, Park was not different from Synghman Rhee.71 What distinguished Rhee and Chang’s “free-
market” approach from that of Park’s was that he believed the state had a role to modernise and build a strong 
nation through rapid economic growth and development.72 “Growth-first” soon became the motto at the heart of 
the new leadership’s developmental goals. In an interview, Nam Duck Woo clarifies the view of the new leadership: 
‘(…)at the time, nobody, including the President and the bureaucracy believed in the so-called private function of the 
financial market. President Park had a strong belief that if government did take the hands of the bank system, then 
the banks would favour credit to some “unproductive sectors” like restaurants *sic+.”73 Park Tae Gyu points out that 
after the coup d´état, the new military regime employed a group of economists which he names the “state-led 
group”. These economists emphasised the interventionist role of the state in the economy and adopted as their 
models Third World nationalism from countries such as India, Egypt and Turkey.74   
South Korea’s particular historical legacies of Synghman Rhee and Chang Myon, the troubled economic 
environment under the continuous security threat from North Korea, the U.S.’s reduction of aid and pressure for 
economic reforms, and the new leadership’s belief in state-led economic nationalism emerged then as important 
variables shaping the incentives that led Park Chung Hee to establish a system of “socialisation of private risk”. The 
implementation of this system, nevertheless, would not have succeeded if Park Chung Hee had not strategically 
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acted to control a meritocratic bureaucracy with the capacity to hold and maintain such reform initiatives, build a 
supporting coalition with the country’s farmers and business firms, and repress labour. 
  
2.4.4 Co-opting Bureaucrats, Farmers and Businessmen   
Reform of the bureaucracy permitted Park´s full control over the administrative apparatus, and to guarantee 
that it would become increasingly meritocratic and insulated from societal interests. He created a “bifurcated 
bureaucracy” feeding domestic-oriented ministries such as Transportation, Construction and Home Affairs with 
patronage appointments, while guaranteeing the professionalism of the economic ministries such as EPB, Finance or 
Trade and Industry.75Simultaneously, Park Chung Hee set in 1961 a Ministry of Government Affairs in charge of 
supervising and reorganising the bureaucracy, to impede the influence of the National Assembly on personnel policy, 
a widespread practice during the previous regimes. Under Park Chung Hee, bureaucrats were also given the 
assurance that if they achieved the performance goals set at the top, they could be promoted to a more prestigious 
position “all the way up to that of minister.”76Appointments of military officers were particularly important in the 
early years of the regime, because Park Chung Hee needed not only to keep military support in all sectors of the 
bureaucracy as a means of consolidating and keeping control, but also to include in the new administration 
individuals with management skills as the Korean military had become modernised more than any other national 
organisations.77     
Park´s regime also sought the involvement of the country’s farmers in this growth-oriented alliance. Park sought to 
establish the legitimacy of his regime by attracting the support of the rural majority in a country where the main 
economic activity was still agriculture. In Korea, even for authoritarian regimes, political legitimacy has rested on 
whether or not the ruler has the “mandate of heaven” to govern, drawn from the support of the people.78Despite 
the continuing allegations of illegal practices, the election process has been regarded as a mechanism capable to 
measure the degree of popular support for candidates. A majority of the votes would confer the highly symbolic 
“mandate of heaven”.79Several agricultural policies pursued by the regime had positive impact in the development 
of the rural economy. For example, the military regime reorganised the agricultural and marketing institutions by 
bringing together the agricultural cooperatives and the Agriculture Bank were brought together into one institution 
named National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation (NACF). This institution was to become responsible for 
allocating credit to farmers, provide them with agricultural inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides, and marketing 
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farm crops. The creation of an Office for Rural Development (ORD) was also important for the distribution of 
improved seed, and information on new crops and cultivation techniques.80 
 
Finally, these institutional and policy reforms by strengthening the autonomy and capacity of the state, in 
particular of the executive, provided it with the power to transform the nature of state-business ties. Park’s regime 
was still dependent on business to implement industrial policies and deliver economic growth. However, it also 
controlled the country’s financial system which strengthened its capacity to negotiate the rules of the game. The 
relationship was thus more interdependent than one dominated by the state. The relationship between the two 
actors was further enhanced by Korean state willingness to prevent the formation of labour movements that could 





Park created a system of “socialisation of private risk” by redefining the role of the Korean state and 
strengthening its autonomy and capacity through four main strategies: (1) concentration of power in the executive; 
(2) the development of effective clusters comprised of professional economic bureaucrats; (3) state control of the 
financial system and; (4) an alliance with bureaucrats, farmers and business groups. I argue that the incentives that 
led Park to create such system were shaped by historical legacies, economic conditions, U.S. pressures for economic 
reform, and a belief on state-led economic nationalism. Park Chung Hee set the foundations for the system of 
“socialisation of private risk”. The institutionalisation of the system rested on the capacity of Park Chung Hee to 
sustain the system through a credible commitment to an alliance with bureaucrats, chaebol and farmers. The 
credible commitment comprised not only of incentives but also penalties.  
 
The Korean experience of building a developmental state does raise questions about the possibility to 
replicate it in other developing countries, particularly in Africa. But what it seems to tell us is that instruments 
necessary to implement the developmental state - a strong executive power, a technocratic and competent 
bureaucracy and growth-oriented economic policies - can institutionally be put in place in other late developing 
countries but they might not be sufficient to achieve the desired national development. Ultimately if there are no 
rulers with a growth-oriented vision politically supported by a strong local coalition, national development will be 
hard to achieve. 
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